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Abstract
We suggest a model of innovation and diﬀusion of a new technology in which two
ﬁrms, one innovative and one non-innovative, undertake risky activities that are
regulated by liability rules. One originality of this study is to consider the presence
of a “double-impact” innovation, impacting both the cost of risk prevention and
the probability of accident. We compare strict liability and negligence in terms of
incentives to innovate, to adopt the new technology and to prevent the risk. We
ﬁnd that the type of innovation and the behavior of the Regulator play key roles:
when the Regulator acts as a “leader”, a negligence rule is socially preferable if the
innovation mainly impacts the cost of risk prevention. In other cases (Regulator
as a “follower” and/or innovation with suﬃciently high impact on the probability
of accident), strict liability is preferable.
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11 Introduction
In a broad sense, innovation could be deﬁned as the process by which an agent raises
(ﬁnancial, physical, intellectual) resources to develop a new technology enabling him
to increase the eﬀectiveness of his eﬀort in achieving his business, his goals. The “Oslo
manual” (Org. of Eco. Coop. Dev (1997)) distinguishes product technological innovation
from technological process innovation. In the last case, innovation is characterized by
the “implementation/adoption of new or signiﬁcantly improved production or delivery
methods. It may involve changes in equipment, human resources, working methods or a
combination of these.”1: innovation is a source of technological progress.
The economic analysis has early recognized the key role of technological progress (and
so, the role of innovation); the technological progress being a key factor in the economic
growth on the long term for Solow (1956). Starting from this point, a ﬁeld of industrial
economics tries to identify the best policy instruments (patents, prizes, research con-
tracts, subsidies,...) to incite the ﬁrms to undertake innovation processes (research and
development, R&D) in order to improve the eﬃciency of production capacities. Some
studies points out some particular features of the R&D market that disrupt the optimal
allocation of resources to innovation, especially the presence of spillovers (Arrow (1962),
Hartwick (1984), d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988)).
The concept of spillovers refers to the positive externality inherent to the R&D process.
Indeed the economic analysis deﬁnes innovation as a search for information research
about new technologies. Thus, as a public good, some part of the information can be
freely acquired by other agents on the market, thereby reducing the incentives to invest
in R&D. Two kinds of spillovers are distinguished: the input spillovers refer to the ex-
ternality that occurs during the research phase of the R&D process (exchanges between
researchers from diﬀerent ﬁrms,...); they beneﬁt to other ﬁrms from the research sector
(see Hartwick (1984), d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988), Helm & Schöttner (2008), En-
dres et al. (2008)). On the other hand the output spillovers refers to the ability of some
1See Org. of Eco. Coop. Dev (1997) p 8.
2ﬁrms to imitate the innovation once it is developed (e.g. by using information contained
in patents; see Martin (2002), Fischer et al. (2003)).
Later, the willingness to promote the technological progress (by providing incentives
to R&D) has also become one of the main concerns for environmental economics. Fol-
lowing Kneese & Schultze (1975), a current of environmental economics focus on the
role the technical progress can play in the regulation of pollutant eﬄuents. More pre-
cisely, these studies analyze the incentives provided by diﬀerent environmental policy
tools (eﬄuent taxes, abatement subsidies, emission permits,...) to develop and/or to
adopt more eﬃcient (i.e. with a lower marginal cost) abatement pollution technologies2.
In this ﬁeld, the more recent studies take also into account the speciﬁcities of the R&D
market, notably the presence of spillovers (e.g. Fischer et al. (2003)) and the interactions
between the research sector and the industry which is the source of the pollution (e.g.
Parry (1995), David & Sinclair-Desgagné (2010), David et al. (2011)).
However, to our knowledge, before the contributions of Alfred Endres and co-authors
(and more speciﬁcally Endres & Bertram (2006) and Endres et al. (2008)), the civil lia-
bility has not been recognized as a policy tool which can provide incentives to induced
technological change3, i.e. which can incite the ﬁrms to adopt and/or to design a new
technology which permits to reduce more eﬃcently a negative externality of production.
Following the seminal work of Calabresi (1970), Brown (1973) and Shavell (1980),
the economic analysis of civil liability studies the role this legal instrument can play in
the prevention of risks resulting from human activities. By setting a legal obligation to
repair ex post the damage his activity can cause, the civil liability system provides ex
ante incentives to an agent to reduce the risk of accident by applying prevention mea-
2Among the “classics” in the economic analysis of this question, we can cite Downing & White (1986)
and Milliman & Prince (1989).
3In the frame of “product-risks”, some studies focus on the incentives to invest in R&D to precise
and/or to reduce a risk of accident (see Schwartz (1985), Viscusi & Moore (1993) Daughety & Rein-
ganum (1995)). But they are not suitable to the analysis of (major) technological risks because they
only consider “low” risks (no insolvency, except in Baumann et al. (2011)) and they focus on the rela-
tionship between ﬁrms and consumers: the latter have an inﬂuence on the proﬁts of the former, while
there exists no such interaction in the context of major technological risks.
3sures (that can reduce the probability and/or the magnitude of the damage). Hence,
these studies generally consider an agent who have to set an optimal (for him) level of
prevention, say x, in order to minimize the sum of a cost of prevention, c(x), and an
expected cost of damages, D(x), under the inﬂuence of the liability system. But the func-
tions c(.) and D(.) are exogenously given. In the context of ﬁrms facing a technological
risk, these studies thus leave out the possibility for the ﬁrms to undertake a technologi-
cal change via the adoption or the development of a new and more eﬃcient technology,
characterized by new functions c2(.) and/or D2(.) with c′
2(.) < c′(.), D′
2(.) < D′(.). A
fortiori these studies do not consider the role the liability system can play in terms of
incentives to develop and/or to adopt a new technology of risk prevention.
That is why Alfred Endres and co-authors have begun a connection between the eco-
nomic analysis of civil liability and the studies (in environmental economics) devoted
to the incentives to promote technological change in the frame of pollutant emissions
regulation. In the context of technological risk prevention, such a connection permits to
consider the eﬃciency of liability rules and regimes in a broader point of view and, for
instance, it permits to put into perspective the well-known ineﬃciencies of the limited
liability4 regime: considering a ﬁrm facing two available technologies, Jacob & Spaeter
(2010) show that a ﬁrm, which is potentially insolvent in the case of an accident, can
have incentives to adopt a new technology leading to lower probability and level of dam-
age, thus permitting her to internalize the risk in full. This result should be considered in
the light of the conclusions of Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest (2005): without the possibility
to undertake such a technological change, they show that a ﬁrm which is potentially
insolvent in the case of an accident has no incentives to adopt some measures that can
reduce the magnitude of damage.
Nevertheless, this connection between law and economics and environmental eco-
nomics is recent and it is necessary, in many extent, to complete the existing works.
First, Endres et al. (2008) compare two liability rules in terms of incentives to de-
4See e.g. Shavell (1986): in the presence of potential insolvency in the case of an accident (i.e.
when the amount of damage exceeds the ﬁnancial capacities of the ﬁrm), the limited liability regime
externalizes a part of the cost of the risk. This may provide suboptimal incentives to prevent the risk.
4velop a more eﬃcient risk prevention technology, but the authors consider an industry
composed of several symmetric ﬁrms, which have the same ability to undertake a R&D
process. They focus on incentives to innovate by considering only innovative ﬁrms sub-
ject to input spillovers. Such a setup can lead to two remarks.
On the one hand, Endres et al. (2008) put aside the diﬀusion of the innovation to ﬁrms
which have not the same ability in terms of R&D. But such a diﬀerence among ﬁrms
is important: the possibility to diﬀuse an innovation to other ﬁrms (and earning some
fees) can be one of the main motivation to innovate. Endres & Friehe (2011) consider
the possibility to diﬀuse the innovation, but in a context that can not be applied to the
study of technological risks (nonpoint source pollution).5 Moreover, they consider that
the maximal extent of the output spillovers is chosen by the innovative ﬁrm: contrary to
what usually prevails in studies dealing with R&D (see e.g. Martin (2002)), the output
spillovers are a decision variable and not an externality that the ﬁrm has to bear.
On the other hand, Endres et al. (2008) (as some studies in industrial economics:
Hartwick (1984), d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988),...) consider input spillovers as
a “curse” which discourage the ﬁrms to innovate. Nevertheless, some studies in innova-
tion economics and economics of science consider input spillovers as a necessity to the
success of R&D processes, which are costly, complicated and uncertain; this is not a
barrier to innovation (see Dasgupta & David (1994), Diamond (1996), Callon (1999),
Depret & Hamdouch (2009)). According to these authors, the design of an innovation
need contributions coming from a multitude of diﬀerent actors; the success of the R&D
process is conditioned to the “good” combination of these diﬀerent contributions. The
input spillovers (called knowledge spillovers in these literatures) are thus a necessity
during the research phase, permitting to carry out this necessary catalysis6. Far from
being seen as a curse that automatically aﬀects all innovative ﬁrms, the input spillovers
5Endres & Friehe (2011) consider two ﬁrms contributing to the same global pollution: it is impossible
to determine the individual contributions to the global damage, so that the individual liabilities are
arbitrarily determined. Hence, the pollution of one ﬁrm impacts the liability incumbant to the other
ﬁrm: such an interaction is not compatible with technological risks.
6Some authors (Audretsch & Feldman (1996), Feldman (1999), Depret & Hamdouch (2009)) argue
for a geographical proximity of these diﬀerent actors in order to facilitate an organizational and cognitive
connection between them, and thus to facilitate this catalysis. They distinguish the “world of science”
from the “world of the technology”, composed of ﬁrms wanting to impose their standards (Dasgupta &
David (1994), Diamond (1996), Callon (1999)).
5are a phenomenon that is necessary to bring out and maintain in a “world of science”
(Dasgupta & David (1994)), composed of a multitude of complementary actors, whose
interaction is a necessity to complete the innovation process.
Finally, we can remark that Endres et al. (2008), as in environmental economics, con-
sider only innovations that permit to reduce the cost of applying prevention measures
(or emissions abatement, in the context of pollution control). In this context, they com-
pare two liability rules (strict liability and negligence) in terms of incentives to prevent
a risk and to design a new (and more eﬃcient) risk prevention technology. However, as
we show in this paper, when studying civil liability as a mean to promote innovation,
the type of innovation that can (potentially) be achieved is an essential feature. In the
context of technological risk regulation, we can imagine that the technological progress
leads to a reduction in applying risk prevention measures (as in Endres et al. (2008)),
or leads to a higher eﬃciency of these measures in reducing the level of the risk, or
even both of these properties. But, depending on the type of innovation that could be
designed, we will show that the ranking of liability rules (concerning their objetives in
terms of risk prevention and innovation) is diﬀerent.
Finally, our study considers questions of innovation and technological diﬀusion, since
we draw an economy composed by two ﬁrms having diﬀerent ability in terms of R&D.
Hence the “innovative ﬁrm” has the possibility to diﬀuse her innovation to the “non-
innovative ﬁrm”.
As in Fischer et al. (2003) and Endres & Friehe (2011), we consider the presence of
output spillovers but, contrary to Endres & Friehe (2011), we see these kind of spillovers
as a negative externality (as traditionally assumed: see Martin (2002), Fischer et al.
(2003)). However, contrary to Endres et al. (2008), we do not consider input spillovers
(during the research phase); their negative impact on the incentives to innovate being
disputed by contributions in innovation economics and economic of science. So we focus
our analysis on incentives problems located after the research phase.
Considering the pioneer work of Endres et al. (2008), we analyze the impact of strict li-
6ability and negligence in terms of incentives to prevent a risk of accident and to design a
new (and more eﬃcient) risk prevention technology. However we consider an innovation
having a “double-impact” on the risk prevention technology: instead of only considering
an innovation which permits to reduce the cost of applying risk prevention measures,
we consider an innovation which also has an impact on the probability of accident. We
show that the civil liability, as a mean to foster innovation, is sensitive to the type of
innovation which can be designed. So we show that in the presence of a “cost-innovation”
(having only an impact on the cost of prevention, not on the probability of accident)
the negligence rule is preferable to strict liability. But the eﬃciency of the strict liability
rule increases as the part of the technological progress that impacts the probability of
accident becomes larger; strict liability is preferable when the innovation only permits
to reduce the probability of accident.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions and the social
optimum. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the comparative analysis, and respectively present
the case where the ﬁrms are subject to a strict liability rule and the case where they
are subject to a negligence rule. Section 5 concludes and outlines avenues for future
research.
2 A model of “double-impact” innovation
First, we present the assumptions of the model, then we present the schedule of
decisions. This sections ends with an analysis of the socially optimal behavior, which
will permit us to evaluate the relative eﬃciency of the diﬀerent liability rules that we
study in the next sections.
2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a Society composed by two risk-neutral ﬁrms. These ﬁrms do not compet
on the same output market. Nevertheless each ﬁrm conducts a risky activity, that can
7inﬂict a damage D to Society. More precisely we consider a unilateral risk of accident
between strangers in the sense of Shavell (1980): the potential victims are unable to
regulate the level of the risk they bear (we can think of people living close to chemical
ﬁrms for instance). Consider that each ﬁrm is endowed with a default risk prevention
technology, denoted A, which permits her to reduce the probability of accident pA(x) by









However, one of the two ﬁrms can innovate (the ﬁrm denoted I). Hence, by investing
an amount e > 0 in a R&D process, she can design a new technology, denoted B, that
is more eﬃcient than the technology A in two extents:
1/ technology B is more eﬃcient than technology A in terms of a higher eﬃciency of






∂x∂e < 0, pB(x,+∞) > 0 ∀x > 0, pB(x,0) = pA(x);
2/ technology B is more eﬃcient than technology A in the sense that, with this new







∂x∂e < 0, cB(x,+∞) > 0 ∀x > 0,
cB(x,0) = cA(x).
We can remark that for e = 0, we have pB(x,0) = pA(x) and cB(x,0) = cA(x): tech-
nology B is identical to technology A, i.e. the absence of investment does not permit to
improve the default technology. Hence we consider that technological progress is only
the consequence of an investment in a R&D process: so we put aside the possibility of
technological progress coming from activity or experience (learning-by-doing).
When a new technology B is obtained, the ﬁrm I has the possibility to freely patent
her innovation and to sell it (licensing) to the other ﬁrm, NI (which can not innovate).
Hence the ﬁrms are diﬀerent regarding the output production, but they can use the same
prevention technology. Such a setting may reﬂect, for instance, a situation in which the
ﬁrms use the same input (a given chemical, e.g. nitrogen) but product diﬀerent outputs
(fertilizer, pesticide, ammonia,...). We suppose that the ﬁrm NI is unable to innovate,
8but it is able to imperfectly imitate the new technology by designing around the patent
(thanks to the information contained this one). As a consequence, the ﬁrm NI has
the ability to design a technology AB, more eﬃcient than A but less eﬃcient than B,
characterized by:
pAB(x) = αpB(x,e) + (1 − α)pA(x) (1)
cAB(x) = αcB(x,e) + (1 − α)cA(x) (2)
The eﬃciency of the technology AB (safety-eﬃciency and cost-eﬃciency) is a linear com-
bination of the eﬃciencies of technology A and technology B, and α is a coeﬃcient which
represents the absorption capacity of NI (α ∈]0,1[). This absorption capacity represents
the ability of NI to absorb the output spillovers provided by the ﬁrm I: the higher α,
the more NI is able to imitate the technology B (and the more AB is eﬃcient).7 So






∂x < 0, and






∂x < 0, x given.
Finally we suppose that there is no insolvency constraint: the ﬁrms are able to compen-
sate the damage in full. In a context of large-scale risks, this may reﬂect the application
of an unlimited liability regime, i.e. when the ﬁrms have to repair any damage whatever
its magnitude8. We will discuss the implications of considering a limited liability regime
at the end of the paper. Given the absence of insolvency constraint, that establishes
some degree of independence between the incentives to produce and the incentives to
prevent the risk, both the assumption of an additive damage D (independent of the level
of activity) and a (simple) approach in terms of cost minimization can be made without
loss of generality.
7This concept can be linked to the concept of absorptive capacity developed by Cohen & Levinthal
(1990), but this latter is introduced in the presence of input spillovers and it depends on the past R&D
experience of the ﬁrm (which beneﬁts from the spillovers). Note that our concept of absorption capacity
can be linked to the “performance” of the patent system: the more the system can be circumvented, the
higher α.
8If the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial capacity is insuﬃcient to repair the damage, then shareholders’ assets are
requested to pay the remaining damages.
9Now, before to begin our analysis, we have to introduce the schedule of decisions.
2.2 Schedule
In a ﬁrst step, the ﬁrm I chooses the amount e to devote to R&D. For e > 0, a
technology B is obtained with certainty9 (if e = 0, there is no technological progress:
only the technology A is available).
Then, the ﬁrm I oﬀers her new technology B to the ﬁrm NI for a price Y . The ﬁrm
NI has to choose between B and her alternative technology AB.
Finally, each ﬁrm chooses the level of prevention measures she wants to apply (x).
The model is solved backward.
Now, we have to determine the socially optimal behavior (in terms of R&D, tech-
nological choice and risk prevention measures) before to compare the two liability rules
(strict liability and negligence).
2.3 The social optimum
We consider the point of view of a public Regulator whose objective is to minimize
the social costs of the activity of the two ﬁrms. We solve, by backward induction, the
three step of the model from his point of view.
2.3.1 The optimal level of prevention
Consider a ﬁrm adopting the technology A. The socially optimal level of prevention
x∗











9It is common to suppose a deterministic R&D process (see Endres et al. (2008), Endres & Bertram
(2006), Fischer et al. (2003)). Even if such an assumption may not well represent the real R&D process,
it simpliﬁes the results without loss of generality (in such a comparative analysis).
10The classical interpretation holds: the socially optimal level of prevention is set in a
manner to equalize the marginal beneﬁt of prevention (in terms of reduction in the
expected cost of damage) to its marginal cost.
If a ﬁrm adopts the technology B, the optimal level of prevention x∗












So, concerning the use of the technology B, the value of x∗
B depends on the amount e
devoted to R&D.
Before to continue the analysis, we must clarify the “double dimension” of the optimal
determination of the risk prevention technology, similarly to what exposed in Endres &
Bertram (2006) and in Endres et al. (2008). As we usually observe in economic analysis
of civil liability, the determination of the optimal risk prevention technology need to
ﬁnd an optimal level of prevention for given cost (c(.)) and probability (p(.)) functions.
However, our analysis considers a second dimension in this problem in the sense that cost
and probability functions are not given. Hence, optimal functions have to be determined
via the search for an optimal level of eﬀort in R&D (see later). As a consequence, for all
e = ˆ e > 0 that is given, leading to given cB(x,e = ˆ e) and pB(x,e = ˆ e) functions, there
is an optimal level of prevention x∗
B as deﬁned by (4), which permits to minimize the
sum of the cost of the expected damage and the cost of prevention (related to the use of
this technology B, with e = ˆ e). However, considering all the technological possibilities
that the investment in R&D permits to reach (i.e. considering the technology A and
all technologies B that can be reached depending on the level of e), there exists only
one and unique optimal level of prevention, x∗∗
B , that minimizes the sum of social costs
of activity. This optimal level x∗∗
B is a best response to functions cB(x,e = e∗) and









In other words, x∗∗
B is the optimal level of prevention when considering the functions
cB(x,e) and pB(x,e) knowing e = e∗.10 Hence (x∗∗
B ,e∗
B) is the unique couple that permits
to minimize the social cost of activity, given the set of all technological possibilities that
can be reached by choosing x and e. Note that when e∗ = 0, if the optimal technology
is A and we obtain x∗∗
B = x∗
A.
2.3.2 The optimal technological choice













Given the properties of the technology B (safety-eﬃciency and cost-eﬃciency), its total
diﬀusion is always socially desirable (from the moment that e∗ > 0).
2.3.3 The optimal investment in R&D

















D = 1 (7)
10x∗∗
B is equal to x∗
B for the special case e = e∗.
11Recall that technology A corresponds to technology B for the special case e = 0.
12Hence, the socially optimal level of investment in R&D is set so as to equalize the
marginal beneﬁt of R&D (in terms of reduction in the cost of applying a given level of
prevention, and in terms of higher eﬃciency of the prevention in reducing the expected
cost of damage) to its marginal cost.
Suppose that this condition is satisﬁed for a level e = e∗ > 0. So the technology A has
to be abandoned and replaced by the technology B.
Now that the optimal behavior is deﬁned, we turn to the comparative analysis of the
behaviors induced by two liability rules.
3 Behaviors under a strict liability rule
Under a strict liability rule, a ﬁrm is liable for all damage she can cause, whatever
her behavior (in terms of prevention and/or innovation). The liability is “automatically”
established, from the moment the damage is a consequence of the ﬁrm’s activity. The
ﬁrms’ choices are the following.
3.1 Behaviors in terms of risk prevention
For some given cB(.,e) and pB(.,e) functions (e > 0 given), and in the absence
of insolvency constaint, the economic analysis of civil liability12 has early shown that
the strict liability rule leads to socially optimal behaviors in terms of risk prevention
(xSL
B = x∗
B)13. Hence, private problem is the same as the social one, deﬁned by (4).
Nevertheless, for the rest of the analysis, we have to distinguish two extreme cases:
1/ Case of a “cost-innovation”:
∂pB(x,e)
∂e = 0 ∀e, pB(x,e) = pA(x) = p(x):















12See e.g. Shavell (1980).
13The superscript SL indicates equilibrium values under strict liability.
13(8) deﬁnes x∗∗
B and (9) deﬁnes xSL
B , in the presence of a “cost-innovation”. Recall that





∂x . Knowing that, in the special case of a cost-innovation, the function






since the marginal cost of prevention is lower with the technology B (than with the
technology A) while the marginal beneﬁts are the same whatever the technology used.
As a consequence, the new technology leads to a decrease in the expected cost of damages
(i.e. p(xSL
B )D < p(xSL
A )D), but the evolution of the cost of risk prevention is uncertain:
the sign of cA(xSL
A ) − cB(xSL
B ,eSL) is undetermined since we have cB(x,eSL) < cA(x) (x
given) and xSL
B > xSL
A (∀ eSL > 0).
2/ Case of a “safety-innovation”:
∂cB(x,e)
∂e = 0 ∀e, cB(x,e) = cA(x) = c(x):
















B and (11) deﬁnes xSL
B , in the presence of a “safety-innovation”. For all




∂x < 0. Knowing that, in the particular case of safety-innovation, the






since the technology B provides a higher marginal beneﬁt of prevention (than technol-
ogy A) whereas the marginal cost of prevention is the same whatever the technology
used. As a consequence, the new technology leads to a decrease in the expected cost in
damages (i.e. pB(xSL
B ,eSL)D < pA(xSL
A )D), but it also leads to an increase in the cost
14of risk prevention because of c(xSL
A ) − c(xSL
B ) < 0.
In a wider setting, as deﬁned in (4), in which the innovation impacts both the cost of
risk prevention and the probability of accident, we can easily check that the technology










∂x , e > 0). This leads to xSL
B > xSL
A : the expected cost of damages is
lowered but, as in the presence of a cost-innovation, there is an uncertainty concerning
the evolution of the cost of prevention.
3.2 Behaviors in terms of technological choice
Whatever the investment e > 0 in R&D, a new technology B is available to the
ﬁrm I, which can sell this new technology to the ﬁrm NI. However, as we said before,
the ﬁrm NI is able to (imperfectly) imitate the innovation: thanks to the information
available in the patent of the technology B (for instance), she is able to develop an
alternative technology AB (designed “around the patent”) that is more eﬃcient than A
but less eﬃcient than B. As a consequence, the maximum selling price of the technology
B, Y SL, is such that:
ENI[ ˜ C
SL



























E[.] is the expected value operator, ˜ C is the (random) cost of activity of the ﬁrm.
Knowing (1) and (2), we obtain:
Y
SL = Y
SL(α) = (1 − α)(cA(x
SL




+ D[(1 − α)(pA(x
SL




15Note that for α = 1 the ﬁrm NI is perfectly able to imitate the new technology: she
has no willingness to pay for the technology B, the ﬁrm I is unable to sell her inno-
vation (Y SL(α = 1) = 0). But we assume perfect information, so that the ﬁrm I can
anticipate the ﬁrm’s NI reaction to a given level of Y SL: the ﬁrm I can ﬁx the price at
its maximum level, in a manner that the ﬁrm NI is indiﬀerent between B and AB (in
that case we suppose she buys B). Nevertheless, the threat of adopting an alternative
technology AB prevents the ﬁrm I from appropriating the whole social beneﬁts from her
innovation, because she is unable to appropriate the whole beneﬁt the ﬁrm NI derives
from the adoption of B.
Again, we can distinguish the two extreme cases:
1/ Case of a “cost-innovation”:
∂pB(x,e)
∂e = 0 ∀e, pB(x,e) = pA(x) = p(x):
Consider (12) in the frame of this particular case. We can see that D[(1 − α)(p(xSL
A ) −
p(xSL
B ))] > 0, whereas the sign of (1 − α)(cA(xSL
A ) − cB(xSL
B ,eSL)) is unsure.
2/ Case of a “safety-innovation”:
∂cB(x,e)
∂e = 0 ∀e, cB(x,e) = cA(x) = c(x):
Consider (12) in this special case. We observe D[(1 − α)(pA(xSL
A ) − pB(xSL
B ,eSL))] > 0
and (1 − α)(c(xSL
A ) − c(xSL
B )) < 0.
In a wider setting (as in (12)), we obtain conclusions that are similar to the speciﬁc
case of a cost-innovation: the decrease in the expected damages D[(1 − α)(pA(xSL
A ) −
pB(xSL
B ,eSL))] leads to a higher willingness to pay for the new technology. However, the
evolution of the cost of risk prevention is unsure, because the new cost function is low-
ered (cB(.,e) < cA(.)) but the level of risk prevention measures is higher (xSL
B > xSL
A ).
Nevertheless, given the fact that the new technology is socially desirable, and knowing
that strict liability leads to a full internalization of the risk (when there is no insolvency
constraint), the decrease in expected damages oﬀsets the (possible) increase in the cost
of prevention: Y SL(α) is positive from the moment that α < 1.
Remark 1: in the presence of a strict liability rule, for all α with α < 1, when the new
technology is available (eSL > 0) she is diﬀused to the ﬁrm NI.
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D = 1 (13)
Knowing that, whatever e, we have xSL
i = x∗
i, we can state the following remark.
Remark 2: in the absence of spillovers (α = 0), the level of investment in R&D when
a strict liability rule is in force is optimal (eSL = e∗).
But for all α such that α > 0, we obtain eSL < e∗ since the marginal beneﬁt from R&D
decreases in α. Considering (4) and knowing
∂2pB(x,e)
∂x∂e < 0 and
∂2cB(x,e)




Remark 3: in the absence of spillovers (α = 0), the level of risk prevention measures
that is adopted when a strict liability rule is applied is optimal (xSL
B = x∗∗
B ). However,
for all α > 0, the level of risk prevention is lower than the optimum (xSL
B < x∗∗
B ).
Regarding the two extreme types of innovation, we obtain:
1/ Case of a “cost-innovation”: (
∂pB(x,e)




2/ Case of a “safety-innovation”: (
∂cB(x,e)




For each case, the same remark prevails: in the absence of spillovers, strict liability is
optimal. The presence of spillovers leads to a lower investment in R&D14.
Gathering the statements of Remarks 1, 2 and 3, we obtain the following result.
14This can be checked by comparing the ﬁrst-order conditions of eSL relatively to (7), and by con-
sidering
∂pB(x,e)
∂e = 0 and
∂cB(x,e)
∂e = 0 for a cost-innovation and a safety-innovation respectively.
17Proposition 1
(i) In the absence of spillovers, strict liability induces optimal behaviors.
(ii) When a strict liability rule is applied, from the moment that the innovative ﬁrm
has an interest to innovate and that the absorption capacity of the non-innovative ﬁrm
is not maximal(α < 1), the new technology is diﬀused (to the non-innovative ﬁrm).
Hence, in a diﬀerent context than those adopted by Endres et al. (2008) (diﬀusion
of the new technology, “double-impact” innovation), we ﬁnd a similar conclusion: in the
absence of spillovers, strict liability is optimal.
Following the same reasoning, we turn to analyze the behaviors in the presence of
a negligence rule and to compare them with those previously obtained under strict
liability.
4 Eﬃciency of the negligence: the Regulator and the
type of innovation as key points
Contrary to what prevails under strict liability, under negligence the liability is es-
tablished only if it is proved that the ﬁrm was negligent at the moment of the accident.
In other words, it has to be proved before the Court that the ﬁrm, at the moment of
the accident, failed to comply with a minimal standard of risk prevention. Hence, the
scheme of liability is the following:




0 if xi ≥ ¯ xi
D if xi < ¯ xi
L(xi, ¯ xi) is the amount of damages the ﬁrm has to pay in the case of an accident, depend-
ing on the level of risk prevention measures xi and the minimal standard of prevention
¯ xi, previously determined by a Regulator, for the technology i = A,B,AB. We can
observe that the ﬁrm is completely exempted from liability if she adopts a level of risk
prevention measures higher or equal to the standard ¯ xi. In the opposite case, she is fully
18liable, as under strict liability.
In section 2, we have deﬁned the speciﬁcity of our approach (introduced by Alfred
Endres et co-authors), comparatively to what usually prevails in economic analysis of
civil liability, in terms of “double dimension” in the deﬁnition of the optimal risk preven-
tion technology. We have shown that the optimal behavior in terms of risk prevention
does not only lie in the adoption of an optimal level of risk prevention measures, but
it lies also in the choice of an optimal level of investment in R&D, leading to an opti-
mal technology in the sense of optimal cost and probability functions. As a consequence,
prevention measures (x) and R&D eﬀorts (e) are linked. In the presence of a negligence
rule, the role of the Regulator is reinforced: beyond his impact on the ﬁrms’ behaviors
in terms of risk prevention, the Regulator can, in some cases, have an inﬂuence on the
incentives to undertake R&D. Depending on the fact that he takes this inﬂuence into
account or not, we will make a distinction between a Regulator acting as a leader and
a Regulator acting as a follower.
4.1 Behaviors in terms of risk prevention
In a ﬁrst time, consider a Regulator acting as a follower: he ignores the relationship
between risk prevention and innovation. To her mind, the application of the negligence
rule could be deﬁned by the following words: “For a given technology (cB(.,e), pB(.,e)),
e given15, there exists a level of prevention measures x∗
B that permits to minimize the
social cost of activity. A ﬁrm who causes a damage will be held liable if and only if the
level of prevention measures that was adopted at the moment of the accident is strictly
inferior to the standard ¯ xB deﬁned by ¯ xB = x∗
B (for this level of e).”
Given the absence of insolvency constraint, we have shown in section 3 that, for a
given investment e in R&D, the level of prevention measures that is adopted by the ﬁrm
under strict liability (xSL
B ) is equal to the level of prevention that minimize the social
15Recall that for e = 0 we obtain the technology A.
19cost of the activity of the ﬁrm (x∗
B). Moreover, under a negligence rule, a ﬁrm that does
not comply with the standard of prevention is held liable (in the case of an accident)
in the same manner as under strict liability: in that case she has incentives to adopt
xB = xSL
B (for a given level of e). As a consequence, as shown by Shavell (1980), without
insolvency constraint a ﬁrm always has an interest to adopt a standard of prevention
equal to x∗
B: so we have ¯ xB = x∗
B = xSL
B .
Remark 4: for a given technology (cB(.,e), pB(.,e)), e given, strict liability and negli-
gence rule provide optimal incentives to risk prevention.
4.2 Technological choice
Similarly to what prevails under strict liability, the maximal selling price Y N of the
technology B (e > 0) in the presence of a negligence rule is ﬁxed in a manner that
the ﬁrm NI is indiﬀerent between buying the new technology B and adopting her own
alternative technology AB. So we have:
ENI[ ˜ C
N





N = cAB(¯ xAB,e
N)
⇔ Y
N = cAB(¯ xAB,e
N) − cB(¯ xB,e
N)
Considering (1) and (2) we obtain:
Y
N = Y
N(α) = (1 − α)(cA(¯ xA) − cB(¯ xB,e
N)) (14)
Comparatively to Y SL (cf eq. (12)), the value of Y N is independent of the magnitude
D of the damage: when the ﬁrms comply with the standard of prevention, they beneﬁt
from an exemption from liability. As a consequence, the adoption of the new technology
does not permit, from a private point of view, to beneﬁt from a decrease in the cost of
the risk. So the innovative ﬁrm can not include this beneﬁt in the selling price. What is
the impact of this property? We distinguish the two extreme types of innovation:
201/ Case of a cost-innovation (
∂pB(x,e)
∂e = 0, ∀e): in that case, the selling price Y N(α)
can be written as in (14). Knowing ¯ xi = x∗
i = xSL
i for a given technology i = A,B (e
given), and knowing xSL
B > xSL
A , the sign of (cA(¯ xA)−cB(¯ xB,eN)) is unsure (because of
¯ xB > ¯ xA and cB(x,e) < cA(x), e > 0). If the new technology leads to an increase in the
cost of prevention, the ﬁrm NI has no willingness to pay for this new technology.
2/ Case of a safety-innovation (
∂cB(x,e)
∂e = 0, ∀e): in that case we obtain Y N(α) =
(1 − α)(c(¯ xA) − c(¯ xB)). Knowing ¯ xB > ¯ xA, the value of Y N(α) is always negative: the
ﬁrm NI has no willingness to pay for the new technology B.
In a wider frame, when the innovation has an impact on the cost of prevention and
on the probability of accident, we obtain a result similar to the one obtained in the
presence of a cost-innovation, since the cost of the risk is externalized (exemption from
liability) and the innovation leads to a new function cB(.,e) < cA(.).
Remark 5: when a negligence rule is applied, the diﬀusion of the new technology is not
always possible. When the innovation only impacts the probability of accident (safety-
innovation), the diﬀusion never occurs.
4.3 Investment in R&D
Considering the two previous steps, the ﬁrm I’s objective can be written as:
min
e
cB(¯ xB,e) − Y
N(α) + e
⇔ min
e (2 − α)cB(¯ xB,e) − (1 − α)cA(¯ xA) + e





By comparing (15) to (7), it is easy to check that the negligence rule can induce an op-
timal level of investment in R&D only in the presence of a cost-innovation (
∂pB(x,e)
∂e = 0,
21∀e) and when there is no spillovers.
If we consider an innovation having a “double-impact” (on the cost of prevention and on
the probability of accident), a part of the social beneﬁts from innovation is not internal-
ized by the ﬁrms. When the ﬁrms comply with the standard of prevention ¯ xi, i = A,B,
(and it is always the case here), the exemption from liability leads to an externalization
of the cost of the risk. Relatively to its social beneﬁt, the private beneﬁt from adopting
a more eﬃcient risk prevention technology is reduced. This brings suboptimal incentives
to invest in R&D.
To illustrate, consider the extreme case where the innovation is only a safety-innovation
(i.e.
∂cB(x,e)
∂e = 0, ∀e). In the previous subsection we have observed that Y N(α) < 0: the
non-innovative ﬁrm has no willingness to pay for the new technology B. Knowing that
the innovative ﬁrm has an interest to comply with the standard of prevention in order
to be exempted from liability in the case of an accident, her objective function is:
max
e W − c(¯ xB) − e
We know that the level of prevention xSL
B = x∗
B increases with the level of investment
e (see subsection 3.3). Knowing ¯ xB = x∗
B for a given eﬀort e in R&D, it follows that
the severity of the standard of prevention ¯ xB strenghtens with the degree of technolog-
ical advancement. As a consequence, from a private point of view, undertaking R&D
in the presence of a safety-innovation under a negligence rule is only synonymous with
an increase in the cost of risk prevention: the exemption from liability externalizes all
the social beneﬁt from innovation. Incentives to innovate are null (eN = 0), the two
ﬁrms keep the technology A. Hence, the negligence rule can provide optimal incentives
to R&D in the presence of a cost-innovation (and without spillovers), but it can also
provide no incentives at all in the presence of a safety-innovation.
In a wider framework, in the presence of a double-impact innovation, suboptimality
of the negligence rule increases with the relative weight of the “safety-impact” of the
22innovation (i.e. the importance of |
∂pB(x,e)




The more important the safety-impact, the more eN deviates from e∗, and the more the
technology (cB(.,eN), pB(.,eN)) is suboptimal. It follows a higher gap between ¯ xB (i.e.
the level of x∗
B associated to eN) and x∗∗
B (i.e. the level of x∗
B associated to e∗) since x∗
B
increases in e. Moreover, for given level of investment e and cost-impact |
∂cB(x,e)
∂e |, the
level of the corresponding x∗
B increases with the safety-impact of the innovation: the
likelihood to obtain cB(¯ xB,eN) − cA(¯ xA) < 0 is more important, leading to eN = 0.
However, for a given absorption capacity α, strict liability permits the ﬁrm to take into
account the two beneﬁts from innovation: it follows eS > eN, and xSL
B (x∗
B associated
to eSL) higher than ¯ x (x∗
B associated to eN). Strict liability induces behaviors that are
closer from social optimum than negligence, so we can state:
Proposition 2 Assume that a negligence rule holds, and the Regulator acts as a “fol-
lower”.
(i) Incentives to innovate are optimal only in the presence of a cost-innovation, and
in the absence of spillovers; in that case strict liability and negligence are both optimal.
(ii) In all other cases (i.e. with a double-impact innovation or a safety-innovation),
strict liability induces more innovation and prevention than negligence: strict liability is
socially preferable to negligence.
Proof: see Appendix. ￿
Hence, our analysis joins those of Endres et al. (2008) in the sense that, in the pres-
ence of a cost-innovation, strict liability and negligence are equivalent: they are optimal
if there are no spillovers, and they lead to levels of investment and prevention that are
inferior to the optimum when there are spillovers. However, contrary to Endres et al.
(2008), our analysis shows that the suboptimality of the negligence becomes worse when
the part of the technological progress that impacts the probability of accident (safety-
impact) is high.
23Now, we turn to analyze in what extent the Regulator’s behavior can aﬀect the
eﬃciency of the negligence rule.
4.4 Negligence and the Regulator as a leader
Before continuing our analysis, let us return to the behaviors (of the ﬁrm I) in terms
of innovation depending on the liability rule in force. The socially desirable behavior,

























We can remark that, when the part of technological progress impacting the probability
of accident is negligible (i.e.
∂pB(x,e)
∂e → 0), these three conditions are close, especially the
conditions relative to strict liability and negligence. As a consequence, in the presence
of a innovation that mainly impacts the cost of prevention, we have to check if, in our
context, the result highlighted by Endres et al. (2008) can applied or not.
In their analyze, Endres et al. (2008) show that, in the presence of several and identical
ﬁrms who are subject to input spillovers and in the presence of an innovation that only
impacts the cost of prevention, a negligence rule may be socially preferred to a strict
liability rule from the moment that the Regulator takes into account the relationship
between the ﬁrm’s decision in terms of prevention (x) and the ﬁrm’s decision in terms
of innovation (e). Considering our framework, we can also imagine a Regulator taking
a position of leader: instead of taking as given the ﬁrm I’s investment decision and to
24set the standard of prevention for a given technology (cB(.,e), pB(.,e)) (e given), he
could adopt a position of leader16 and ﬁx an only standard, regardless of the level of
investment e. With such a behavior, he could indirectly impose the level of investment
in R&D. Endres et al. (2008) show that ﬁxing a standard of prevention to a level that is
slighlty higher than the level of prevention that would prevail under strict liability incites
the ﬁrms to increase their investment in R&D, thus leading to a decrease in the social
cost of activity: negligence is thus socially preferable to strict liability (see Endres et al.
(2008), Proposition 4).
If the mechanism highlighted by Endres et al. (2008) can be applied to our context (with
asymmetric ﬁrms), the negligence rule could be socially preferable to strict liability in
the presence of a cost-innovation. However, as the technological progress also impacts
the probability of accident (and when the relative importance of this impact becomes
higher), it is less likely that negligence can be preferable to strict liability: under negli-
gence, the externalization of the beneﬁts from innovation in terms of reduction in the
cost of the risk (lower expected damage) leads to lower incentives to invest in R&D (rela-
tively to strict liability). If the level of investment in R&D is lower under negligence than
under strict liability, then the level of risk prevention measures is also lower under neg-
ligence than under strict liability: given
∂2pB(x,e)
∂x∂e < 0 and
∂2cB(x,e)
∂x∂e < 0, we know that the
technology (cB(.,eN), pB(.,eN)) is characterized both by a lower marginal beneﬁt and
a higher marginal cost of risk prevention than the technology (cB(.,eSL), pB(.,eSL)) if
eN < eSL. Considering our framework, we study the implications related to the presence
of Regulator acting as a leader. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 Consider a set of technological possibilities (cB(.,e), pB(.,e)), and as-
sume that the eﬀort e in R&D has an impact on both the cost of prevention (cost-impact,
|
∂cB(.,e)
∂e |  = 0) and the probability of accident (safety-impact, |
∂pB(.,e)
∂e |  = 0).
There exists a threshold value of the safety-impact of R&D, |
∂pB(.,e)
∂e |, relatively to
16Leader and follower terms are directly related to the Stackelberg’s game. Indeed the Regulator who
is a follower is a follower in the sense of Stackelberg: he deﬁnes the standard of prevention after the
ﬁrm’s decision in terms of R&D, thus taking this decision as a given parameter. The ﬁrm (the leader)




∂e |, below which a negligence rule is socially preferred to a strict
liability rule. Beyond this threshold value, strict liability is socially preferable.
Proof: see Appendix. ￿
Let us detail the methodology of this proof. In a ﬁrst step (point 1/ of the proof)
we have to ensure that, in the presence of a negligence rule, a higher investment in R&D
(beyond the level that would prevails under strict liability) leads to a decrease in the
social cost of activity. Then (point 2/), we have to check if it is possible (and under what
conditions) to provide more incentives to innovate, under negligence than under strict
liability, by ﬁxing a standard of prevention the level of which is slightly higher than the
level that would prevails under strict liability. Finally (point 3/), we have to ensure that
ﬁxing a higher standard of prevention (than the strict liability level) leads to a decrease
in the social cost of activity.
Synthesising these three points, this Proposition shows that when the innovation mainly
impacts the cost of prevention (low impact on the probability of accident), we ﬁnd, in
our context, the result highlighted by Endres et al. (2008): a Regulator, acting as a
leader, can induce more investment in R&D by applying a negligence rule. To reach this
result the Regulator has to ﬁx a standard of prevention the level of which is slightly17
higher than the level that would prevails under strict liability. And this permits to reduce
the social cost of activity.
However, when the impact of the technological progress on the probability of accident is
too important (relatively to its impact on the cost of prevention), the diﬀerence between
the two liability rules in terms of incentives to invest in R&D is too high. As a conse-
quence, it is impossible for a ﬁrm to adopt a standard of prevention the level of which
is higher than the level of prevention that would prevail under strict liability: such a
level of risk prevention measures is too costly to adopt given the degree of technological
17“Slightly” higher in the sense that the Regulator has to ensure that the ﬁrm I has an interest
to adopt this higher level of risk prevention (in order to beneﬁt from the exemption from liability).
Otherwise, if the ﬁrm does not comply with the standard the situation is similar to strict liability.
26advancement that it is possible to reach under negligence (depending on the incentives
to R&D provided by this rule). In the presence of such a “double-impact” innovation
(with a high impact on the probability of accident), the mechanism highlighted by En-
dres et al. (2008) does not work any more. Strict liability is thus preferable to negligence
because only low levels of standard of prevention can be adopted under negligence (be-
cause of a low R&D level, leading to a few eﬃcient technology); this rule thus leading
to low levels of R&D and risk prevention measures.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a model of innovation and diﬀusion of a new technology
among ﬁrms, engaged in risky activities, who have diﬀerent abilities regarding R&D:
one innovative ﬁrm faces one non-innovative ﬁrm, but the latter has the possibility to
imperfectly imitate the innovation once developed (output spillovers). We consider a
“double-impact” innovation, in the sense that the technological progress it provides has
both an impact on the cost of applying risk prevention measures, and an impact on
the probability of accident. The aim of this study, in the spirit of Endres et al. (2008),
is to compare two liability rules (strict liability and negligence) in terms of incentives
to prevent a risk of accident and to engage in R&D to design a new risk prevention
technology that is more eﬃcient.
Two key facts have to be highlighted. First we ﬁnd, in our context, a result which
is similar to those of Endres et al. (2008): in the presence of an innovation which only
impacts the cost of prevention and in the presence of spillovers (leading to suboptimal
incentives to R&D), the negligence rule may be preferable to strict liability. Indeed, un-
der perfect information, the Regulator knows the whole set of technological possibilities.
He can act as a leader (in the sense of Stackelberg) by ﬁxing a standard of prevention,
regardless of the innovative ﬁrm’s decision in terms of R&D, in order to have an inﬂu-
ence on this decision. By ﬁxing a standard of prevention beyond the level of prevention
that would prevail under strict liability, the Regulator provides more incentives to invest
27in R&D in order to reduce the cost of complying with the standard of prevention. This
mechanism partially oﬀsets the suboptimal incentives to invest in R&D (related to the
presence of spillovers), and thus leads to a decrease in the social cost of activity.
However, when the technological progress suﬃciently impacts the probability of acci-
dent, our study shows that strict liability is socially preferable to negligence; in the limit
case where the innovation is strictly a “safety-innovation” the negligence rule provides
no incentives to innovate or to adopt the new technology.
Hence, these results extend the result of Endres et al. (2008) to a diﬀerent context,
with diﬀusion of the innovation, but they also restrict it since the nature of the innova-
tion plays a key role on the ranking of liability rules in terms of incentives to innovate
(in order to reduce the risk).
Nevertheless, the economic analysis of externalities (risk, pollution) prevention via
technological change induced by the legal frame is relatively new. So this study could
(and should) be extended, and some strong assumptions have to be relaxed.
First of all it would be desirable, in a ﬁrst extension, to take into account the pos-
sibility for the ﬁrms to be insolvent in the case of an accident, especially in the frame
of a limited liability regime. In this study, we have put aside this possibility in order to
lighten calculations and to easily compare our results with those of Endres et al. (2008).
However, in the presence of a limited liability regime, it is well-known in the economic
analysis of civil liability that strict liability may induce, for a given technology, subop-
timal behaviors in terms of risk prevention when the potential damage are higher than
the patrimonial value of the ﬁrm. In this regard, a negligence rule may be preferred to
the extent it provides incentives to adopt a higher level of prevention measures than
strict liability, thanks to the possibility for the ﬁrm to be exempted from liability in
the case of an accident (see Shavell (1986)). However we show that, in the presence of
a double-impact innovation, strict liability may induce higher eﬀorts in R&D when the
safety-impact of the innovation is suﬃciently important. As a consequence, in the pres-
28ence of a limited liability regime and high potentiel damage, a trade-oﬀ may appear in
some contexts: for a given technology the negligence rule induces more risk prevention
measures, but strict liability permits to induce more innovation, leading to a more eﬃ-
cient risk prevention technology. Moreover, in the presence of a stochastic R&D process
(that does not succeed with certainty), the beneﬁts from applying a negligence rule may
be higher: to obtain a higher level of risk prevention measures with certainty may be
more valuable than obtain a higher investment in R&D leading, without certainty, to a
more eﬃcient risk prevention technology.
Then, we have to temper the scope of our results in the light of the assumptions we
pose. Indeed we suppose perfect information, notably between the Regulator, the Court
and the ﬁrms. But in the presence of imperfect information between these actors, ap-
plying a negligence rule may be problematic in two respects. On the one hand, applying
such a rule needs to collect information to deﬁne ex ante the standard of prevention.
Beyond the cost of such a collect, an inaccurate deﬁnition of the standard provides sub-
optimal incentives to prevent the risk. On the other hand, information have also to be
collected ex post to establish the liability of the ﬁrms in the case of accidents. Beyond
the direct cost of gathering information, other costs have to be taken into account: when
the Court imperfectly observes the ﬁrms’ behaviors in terms of risk prevention, an un-
certainty is introduced in the sense that the ﬁrms do not know with certainty what level
of risk prevention measures to adopt in order to be exempted from liability. This may
provide suboptimal incentives to prevent the risk, and it can lead to judicial error in
the establishment of liability (see e.g. Fluet (2010)). All these costs, that we do not take
into account in our analysis, suggest that the eﬃciency of the negligence rule may be
overestimated when perfect information is supposed.
Finally, we have to keep in mind that applying a negligence rule also question the
allocation of the costs of the damage. Indeed, when the ﬁrms comply with the standard
of prevention, all the cost of the damage is borne by the victims. In the presence of
large-scale damage, such a situation may be socially very costly. Even if the negligence
rule can provide more incentives to innovate and to prevent the risk (in the presence
29of an innovation that mainly impacts the cost of risk prevention - low impact on the
probability of accident), thus permitting to reduce the probability of occurrence of an
accident, to allocate all the cost of the accident to the victims necessarily raises the
question, for the Society, of the trade-oﬀ between equity and prevention.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Point (ii): whatever the liability rule that is applied, at equilibrium we have xk
i = x∗
i
(e given, k = SL,N) and we have innovation and diﬀusion, or no innovation: ∀ α < 1,
there is no situation where I has an interest to innovate and NI has no interest to adopt
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∂e2 > 0. Concerning the expressions V and Z, we can check that
Z is, in absolute value, higher than V by considering (4) and knowing
∂2pB(x,e)
∂x∂e < 0 and
∂2cB(x,e)
∂x∂e < 0. Moreover, this property permit to check than dx
de > 0 (or we can use the im-






> 0). All these elements lead to dSC
de |0<e<e∗ < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3
This proof follows three points (detailed in the article). Point 1/: from the proof of
point (ii) of the Proposition 2, we know that, for a given e > 0, the social cost of activity
is the same whatever the liability rule in force. ∀e with e < e∗, an increase in e reduces
the social cost of activity. Given eSL < e∗ when α > 0, an increase in e beyond the level
eSL is socially desirable.
Point 2/: admit that the Regulator applies a standard ¯ xB = x∗∗
B (which is the level of
prevention that would be adopted under strict liability in the absence of spillovers). We
obtain:
eN such that: −(2−α)
∂cB(x∗∗
B ,eN)






∂e D = 1
We have eN < e∗ (spillovers and externalization of the social beneﬁt in terms of reduction
in expected damage).
Now we have to compare eN to eSL. First, considering (4) with e = e∗ then with e = eSL
(knowing
∂2pB(x,e)


















∂e = 1, and −(2 − α)
∂cB(xSL
B ,eSL)
∂e − (2 − α)
∂pB(xSL
B ,eSL)
∂e D = 1
For
∂pB(.,e)




∂e > −(2 − α)
∂cB(x∗∗
B ,eN)






∂e | is suﬃciently low (innovation that mainly impact the cost of
prevention), and knowing
∂2cB(x,e)
∂e2 > 0 we obtain e∗ > eN > eSL.
However, if the importance of |
∂pB(.,e)
∂e | comparatively to |
∂cB(.,e)
∂e | is suﬃciently high, the
marginal beneﬁt from R&D under strict liability can be deeply higher than the marginal
beneﬁt under negligence (for a given x). Knowing dx
de > 0, in the presence Regulator
acting as a follower we can obtain: eSL > eN and xSL
B > ¯ xB. This diﬀerence becomes
stronger with the relative weight of |
∂pB(.,e)
∂e |: beyond some threshold, the importance
of the safety-impact is so high that it is impossible for a ﬁrm to adopt a standard of
31prevention the level of which is higher than the level of prevention that would prevail
under strict liability: the level of xSL
B is too high, too costly to reach (knowing the
degree of technological advancement that can be reached under negligence - relatively
low incentives to R&D under negligence in that case). As a result, it is possible to impose
a standard of prevention ¯ xB > xSL
B only if the safety-impact (|
∂pB(.,e)
∂e |) of the innovation
is limited.
















































      
(Z)
(V ) represents the net marginal social beneﬁt from prevention, (Z) represents the net
marginal social beneﬁt from R&D.
If we pose ¯ xB = xSL





























      
Z:<0
The condition (V ) is equal to zero (equilibrium condition of x∗
B) while condition (Z)
is negative (see (15)). As a consequence, the negativity of dSC
dx |¯ xB=xSL
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